On 22 June 2015 at 12:32, Joseph Paul <josephnjody@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
On 6/21/2015 8:01 PM, rupert.boleyn@gmail.com wrote:
On 21 Jun 2015 at 18:30, Joseph Paul wrote:

Greg - <snip explanatory details to Greg about the fitness of the mission of the M2 and how it was designed to out do the BMP-1>
Hey Rupert!
The M-2 is also rather newer, much bigger, and rather more expensive.
 Yes - which is an indicator that the American's were looking to out perform the BMP-1. They saw the value of the tactical role of an IFV as opposed to a 'battle taxi' and made one of their own that fit the circumstances they felt they would be facing. Strong belief in combined arms and you can't do that when your tanks have raced ahead of the infantry.
​Joseph, the point I made is that outperforming the BMP-1 based on technical performance is not the design objective.
IF the US Army saw a need for a combained arms IFV role, why did it take the apparance of the BMP-1 to start the program, and why did this take two decades?
Tanks racing ahead of the infantry is not part fo the 'combined arms' tactics.​
 

As for the limitations of the BMP-1:

The gun was never intended for long-range work. It was intended to cover the short
range zone where the ATGW wasn't effective, to give a more rapid response, and to
also give fire support to the infantry against other infantry. It didn't need more reach
than 500m.

As for the TOW out-ranging the AT-4 (and earlier AT-3) - as in Europe the vast majority
of engangements involving armour vs armour would've been at 800m or less, due to
visibility and line-of-sight, having more range than a couple of kilometres is a waste.
 Greg made the assertion that NATO misunderstood the role of the BMP-1 and that the M2 was a failure because it was made upon a faulty premise. Greg's understanding of the purpose of the BMP-1 is that it is an anti-tank weapon. Well sort of. It supports infantry with anti-tank capability so that the opposing force can't just rush tanks by. If that is the mission then he seems to turn a blind eye to the AT capability of an 80's era M2 and it's squad.

​Most of the BMP-1 & 2 squad is not 'infantry'.
Most of the NATO 'infantry' was mounted in APCs as of 1982, the first M-2s being issued in mid-1983​ "On May 10, 1983, the 1-15 INF was the first battalion in USAREUR to field the new Bradley IFV." (2d Brig. 3ID) Proficiency with the new vehicle woudl take 2-3 years, resulting in the reorganisation of the US Army's Infantry in 1988 when it was found that the originally intended platoon didn't function very well.
 
Re- lack of long range in Europe - Except where you have prepared positions that give you that advantage and I am pretty sure the American army in the Fulda Gap didn't just say "oh foo we can't see the road from here."  In guns long range equates to quick arrival at shorter ranges and most missiles follow the same. the quicker a missile gets there the less chance it has of being evaded or having the operator lose control. As it turns out you may not know where you are going to fight so range probably isn't wasted if you have it. Accurate long range fire came in handy in the Gulf War for instance.
​The US Army Europe occupied a wider front than the Fulda Gap. Why would you, or anyone, think that the Fulda Gap was going to be the min line of effort for the Warsaw Pact, even on the southern flank of that theatre?
I'm not sure what missiles you are talking about.
Accurate long range fire requires accurate targeting data. In the Gulf War this was available because most Iraqi forces were stationary. ​
 

Ooh! here is a little treatise on the employment of the BMP by the
Soviets culled from their sources. Please not how often mention is
made of preparing for a friendly nuclear attack.
Reality of cold-war planning. If the US manuals didn't mention this, they were being
delusional.

 This refers to Greg wondering why any one thought the Soviets would pop a nuke. It is right there in their doctrine. And he did in depth research.

​I still don't know what treatise is being cited here.
All of Soviet military publications for foreign consumption were heavily edited and sensored.
Critical thinking was a must when reading them.

Greg​