>So then this was a shakedown run for these tanks which should have been
done before hand but was not, to save costs for the manufacturing
company.<
No, the 'shakedown' was performed during initial acceptance for service in Ft Hood I think, and later during conversion in West Germany.
The M1 Abrams story is hard to tell briefly, particularly since its a long one that begins during the Second World War.
Essentially the deployment to Saudi Arabia was based on late-1970s planning. However, due to
CIA's warning that Cold War would turn hot 'any day now', the first block of Abrams production was delivered with the 105mm gun in 83-84 because there wasn't funding for the US-made version of the Rhinemetal 120mm gun. By 1990 these had been returned to continental US, but it is these units that were earmarked for 'expeditionary' deployment.
But, that isn't even the issue.
The Abrams followed the same design and development trijectory all US DoD projects and programs do - overemphasis on 'advanced tachnology'
That is the manufacturing company, General Dynamics would just nod to everything the Army wanted by 'value adding' via integration of everything possible and impossible.
The US Army though was just cought up in the general overconfidence in American 'know how', that is the belief that quality trumps quantity. The budgetary argument it presented to the Congress was that one super tank is worth three, five, ten, 'backward' Soviet technology tanks.
However, an even greater problem was the 'perfect storm' of post-war (2ndWW) defence budget reduction, regognised shortcomings of the M-4 design, failure to understand Soviet, and evolve own viable armoured doctrine, the impetus of the Korean War field need, and what I call "Hirler's larst curse", the unwavering faith in the 'magic bullet' solution of wunderwaffe, i.e. that Advanced Technology can solve all warfare problems, and help a smaller force defeat a larger one.
The M-1 development therefore followed a somewhat of a strange path, abandoning the evolutionary M-26/48/60 path for what initially was supposed to be the US-German MBT-70, but then each country going its own way. The product for both were unquestioningly heavy tanks that had been designed to improve crew survivability, but did not fit the operational or strategic needs of either the USA or NATO. They did however significantly contribute to the GDLS corporate profitability, and continue to be that. The M-1 had been sold only to the Saudis, and also given away at [it is believed] below production costs to the Egyptians. Its design was used as a model by the South Koreans in a lighter package, who are ironically the only country in the World that may really need a heavy tank.
By the time the US Army arrived in Saudi Arabi, it was fielding a mixture of vehicles designed for different mission profiles during different periods, none designed for the sort of plan that was to be executed to defeat the Iraqi Army. Moreover, the US Army hadn't fought in these climatic conditions arguably since 1942. This is why the Desert Storm had to be executed to end as quickly as possible. There were too many uncertainties about the execution, and the longer the operation progressed, the greater the forces of friction would act on the Coalition forces, potentially causing the prolongation of the conflict that was already costing 'an arm and a leg'.
The role of the M-1 Abrams fleet in the whole was just one of many over-designed over-engineered platforms and systems that produced the logistic nightmare for the Coalition as a whole. Only Saddam Hussein's stupidity allowed a Coalition victory in February 1991, not any technological advantage or brilliant generalship.
Greg