On 17 June 2015 at 23:48, Phil Pugliese (via tml list) <nobody@simplelists.com> wrote:
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We'll never know but then we'll also never know how well soviet equip, doctrine, & logistics would have fared either.
 We can theorize but we can't know for sure.
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​Actually no. WP forces effectively re-occupied Czechoslovakia and Hungary using the same 'theoretical' doctrine and equipment, and NATO wasn't able to do much about those operations.​
 

 Neither I not
 the Soviets were theorising.
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Sure they were. They were theorizing how future ops would unfold & how to equip their forces in order to prevail.

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​The operation to occupy West Germany was designed in late-1944, and was only modified from time to time based on increased capabilities.​
 

 You can ask the
 question why immediately after the war the first
 'IFV' designs produced were
 the BTR-152 and BTR-50. The answer is the same as for BTR-60
 and BMP-1.

 The basis of
 designs was wartime experience that was worked out in the
 1930s, and executed
 in over 70 operational-strategic operations between 1941 and
 1945, admittedly
 with varying, but mostly successful results. By 1945 the Red
 Army had it down
 to a fairly good formula.
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The theories they 'worked out' in the '30's didn't work out so well when put to the test.
Not even during the 'Winter War' against Finland in 1940 & esp so in 1941.
It took real-life experience to work-out the kinks.
In the end the standard soviet tactics typically involved horrifyingly high casualties that other nations weren't willing to accept as SOP.
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​The theories that were worked out in the late-20s and early 30s worked very well because they were jointly developed by the Soviet and Weimar officers (discontinued after 1933).
They didn't work very well in Finland because of the Red Army's command structure and organisational culture, and because the Finns managed to put in place a far better defencive system than the Red Army thought.
From 1941 Moscow offensive onwards the theories worked increasingly well as all echelons of command gained more expereince.
​
 
​"In the end the standard soviet tactics typically involved horrifyingly high casualties that other nations weren't willing to accept as SOP." - I put this statement down to your lack of awareness of Second World War history.
The Red Army suffered 8 million in military casualties, of which 4 million were suffered in the first six months of the war.​ (Casualties mean those not returned to combat, so include POWs.
The tactics that involved "horrifyingly high casualties" were predominantly evident during the forementioned initial six months of the war (Summer-Autumn 1941).
As for other nations and their tactics, you only need to read about the Polish and French desperate counter-attacks in 1939-40, British infantry attacks during the Normandy breakout attempts or the USMC assaults of Japanese-held islands to know how wrong you are. Sometimes there is no alternative to a frontal assault. Japanese did it though they conquered much of Asia through a virtually bloodless strategy of operational manoeuvre, and Germans did it in the late war though they were supposed to be masters of manoeuvre tactics. Just read about the fortress-cities.
So that leaves one nation I guess.

 Chobham armour
 is a noteworthy but not entirely relevant factor in the
 development of correlation of forces in Cold War Europe. It
 matters at the
 tactical employment of forces, but is irrelevant
 operationally.
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Well you're the 1st person I've read that has said that.
I'm going to have to side with the numerous others that disagree w/ you.

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​Ok.​
 

No one in
 Soviet Union ever talked about the 'death of the
 MBT'.
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I never said they did.
Still, I encountered many folks (& read a lot more) that consistently beat that drum & then shut up after the new armor appeared.

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​Its not about new armour. There is a plethora of companies selling new armour invented in just the last decade. The problem is not armour, but how to get this armour onto a beach half a World away in the numbers needed, affordably & efficiently, and still achieve strategic needs. Do you see the British Empire on your map of the World? Do you know what armoured vehicle the British Royal Navy Marines use? It doesn't have Chobham​ armour. It has Swedish armour, and very thin armour at that. The RM brigade is not a strategic or even operational force to project. Its a tactical fleet force that can do 'odd jobs' as long as they don't come up against heavy conventional forces. The USMC is in the same 'boat' if you pardon the pun.

The reason I'm the first person you hear talk this way about Chobham armour is because everyone else talks about tactics, but professionals think about logistics FIRST. Most professionals though have careers and families to support.