>It would be very nice if military procurement programs were all
about having an appropriately-capable military. But they are actually at
least equally about 1) justifying the careers - both past and future -
of the various decision makers involved and 2) providing economic
support for the research and manufacturing complexes involved.
Given
that both 1) and 2) are unlikely to change - particularly in the
capitalism-based Third Imperium - all the various misadventures related
in the up-thread posts here have likely been seen in the OTU. <
Yes Richard, which is why today the USMC and the US Army are irrelevant as operational (former) and strategic (latter) military forces.
Kurt makes an interesting point.
I gave up using Striker some time ago because mix'n'match of weapon sub-systems in platforms doesn't actually win wars, innovation does.
It took me a while to figure out how this worked in Traveller because the anti-grav vehicles don't work properly in the rules, and there were various assumptions about their use TACTICALLY.
After I realised how anti-grav platforms SHOULD BE used, the rest of the tech levels were all obsoleted.
This is what I mean about Gordon R. Dickson's Tactics of Mistake. Mercenaries get paid for the deliverable, not the operational process. No one cares how a project is managed as long as there is a deliverable at the end of it, preferably under budget and on time. Its the regular militaries that do things 'by the book'. However, some wars devolve into warfare that is more 'mercentary' than anything one would find in an officer's manual. Particualry when non-professionals replace professionals.
My argument would be that enticing the opponent to make a mistake was new to Dickson because 'cheating' is against the US military culture. However, it isn't against all military cultures.
The Red Army in desperation of the 1941-42 battles learned that truism which says "if its stupid, but it works, it isn't stupid". What is 'stupid' is something a career, properly educated officer would do if he had a 'by the book' force properly trained that is executing orders as conceived. The chances of this happening on the Eastern Front in those years was close to 0. Consequently most Red Army officers used khitrost', i.e. cunnung, to compensate for their own lack of education, their conscripted troops, their inadequate equipment and support, their lack of time, and a multitude of other impediments. Cunning is the factor of innovation which is the 'daughter' of necessity I mentioned earlier. Cumulative acts of innovative cunning created adequate friction to first slow and then defeat the Wehrmacht which was priding itself on its ability to stick to the 'book' under the most adverse of circumstances.
In a sense Dickson sort of described what happened on the Eastern Front, but he had something else in mind because the first intellectually-honest study of the Eastern Front in the West didn't start until the early 80s.
And this is why I almost always choose Mercenary settings for games. Regular militaries are boring and stupid.
Cheers
Greg